Harmeet Dhillon, the now-former Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (CRIT), has been appropriately hailed as “a jewel for justice” and “the face of the [Trump] administration’s commitment to the Second Amendment.” In her role as chief of CRIT, she “presided over the creation of a dedicated Second Amendment Section and a historic series of lawsuits filed in affirmative support of the right to keep and bear arms.”
A recent ruling out of a federal court in Maryland, however, seeks to cast doubt on the authority used to pursue these cases. Its reasoning – which dodged the constitutional question at the heart of the case –could serve as a roadmap to other judges who believe DOJ’s authority to enforce civil rights somehow excludes the Second Amendment.
The Montgomery County, Maryland, law at the center of the case prohibits the possession, transport, sale or transfer of a firearm “in or within 100 yards of a place of public assembly,” which includes a publicly or privately owned: park, place of worship, school, library, recreational facility, multipurpose exhibition facility (ex. fairgrounds or conference center); any government building open to the public for the business of government or community use, polling place, courthouse, and legislative assembly. Any parking area, grounds or similar associated property are automatically included as part of any “place of public assembly.”
Bill 23-26E was enacted in July 2026 following the ruling in Engage Armament LLC v. Montgomery County, 356 A.3d 79 (Md. 2026), in which the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the “sensitive places” law then in effect, including the definition of “place of public assembly,” exceeded the County’s authority under state law.
Lengthy written testimony by state gun-rights group Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., in opposition to the passage of Bill 23-26E was very clear that the law’s designated “places of public assembly” encompassed thousands of locations in the County: 1,262 public bikeways, 605 houses of worship, 693 public parks (not including four federal parks and any privately owned “parks”), 258 private schools, 137 public elementary schools, 40 middle schools, 25 high schools, 42 public recreation centers, 10 colleges and universities, 29 municipalities, 45 post offices, 38 fire stations, 15 public swimming pools, and 23 public transit/metro /MARC commuter train stations.
The additional, arbitrary 100-yard perimeter imposed by the law for each of these places would include any adjacent public sidewalks, publicly accessible places of commerce (banks, grocery stores and drug stores), and medical and dental facilities (“precisely the type of licensed medical facility that Engage Armament held the County may not regulate”). The bill had “significant extraterritorial impact” because its restrictions applied to and impeded how visitors from outside the County could shop, work or conduct other activities outside of their vehicles, preventing “permit holders from outside the County from shopping or working or even walking on public sidewalks within ‘a substantial portion’ of the County.”
The DOJ alleged that this gun-free zones law violated the rights of County citizens and visitors under the Second Amendment and sought a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief to bar the expected enforcement of Bill 23-26E. As the DOJ press release explains, the law “makes it practically impossible for individuals in the County to go about their daily business while lawfully carrying a firearm,” adding that “the Civil Rights Division will not stand idle while Montgomery County tramples the rights guaranteed to law-abiding citizens by the Second Amendment.” The defendants, the complaint stated, “have engaged in, and, on information and belief, will continue to engage in, a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives persons” of constitutional rights.
The federal law underpinning the lawsuit, 34 U.S.C. § 12601, declares it to be unlawful for “any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers … that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” The statute directs the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, to seek “appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice” in a civil lawsuit, whenever “the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred.”
On November 9, U.S. District Judge Theodore Chuang, a Barack Obama appointee, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal suit without any examination of whether the challenged law violated the Second Amendment or was supportable under the Bruen standard.
In a nutshell, he concluded that the Government’s claim, asserted pursuant to the civil enforcement authority in 34 U.S.C. § 12601, failed because that statute requires a “pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers” that deprives persons of constitutional rights, and arguments of facial invalidity and the “expected enforcement” did not rise to this standard. Section 12601 “generally does not authorize a civil enforcement action based only on an allegedly unconstitutional statute or ordinance” and, even to the extent that the law could be construed to permit a civil enforcement action based on an allegedly unconstitutional policy, it must be one that specifically addresses “conduct by law enforcement officers.” According to the judge, because there was “no claim or record of actual enforcement actions taken” by the police in relation to Bill 23-26E, the Justice Department was barred from relying on the authority of § 12601.
As an additional factor, the judge rejected any broader interpretation of § 12601 “because it would effect a breathtakingly broad expansion of federal power in advancing civil enforcement actions by the federal government against state and local governments.” Even the existence of an unconstitutional law should not suffice, as this would enable the government to “file suit against a state or local law enforcement agency any time it believes that a state or local government has enacted a law that could violate an individual’s constitutional rights, so long as there is some potential for that agency to be called upon to enforce the law.”
The defendants had asked the judge to dismiss the federal lawsuit in its entirety with prejudice, meaning the suit could not be reinstated even when the “pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers” in enforcing the County law is shown. Whether the order included a with-prejudice dismissal isn’t clear from the memorandum opinion, although it has been reported that the dismissal was, in fact, made on this basis.
The federal government became empowered to enforce the rights of U.S. citizens against state abuses as a result of the Civil War and the post-war amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It is a curious legal proposition, to say the least, to assert that DOJ is powerless in the face of an obviously unconstitutional law like Montgomery County’s or that a law specifically threatening criminal penalties for those who engage in constitutionally protected behavior somehow doesn’t apply to a “practice” of the police.
It is even more curious when one considers DOJ’s involvement in cases that concerned the enforcement of school districts’ same sex bathroom rules or prison inmate grooming standards, up to and including at the U.S. Supreme Court. Would Congress really give the Department that authority but deprive it of the ability to enforce an affirmative provision of the Bill of Rights itself?
The decision is independent of the other challenges pending against the County law, although those plaintiffs are litigating without the resources and expertise of the federal government at their disposal. One such lawsuit is by Rabbi Menashe Shapiro of the Silver Spring Jewish Center, alleging that the law violates the First Amendment (free exercise of religion), Second Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment (due process/equal protection).
“This ban,” states the complaint, “could not come at a worse time for Montgomery County’s Jewish community.” The law makes it impossible for worshippers like Rabbi Shapiro, licensed to carry firearms and a volunteer security team member for his place of worship, to walk to synagogue or possess a firearm while there without violating the law. “Jewish law requires Jews to defend themselves when necessary. Montgomery County would rather declare open season.”
The DOJ may still appeal the November 9 decision. A spokesperson was quoted as saying that the “Department is assessing the decision and next steps but remains committed to protecting the Second Amendment rights of law abiding citizens in Maryland.”
One concern is whether the ruling will have broader implications, where the reasoning is adopted by other courts as a convenient precedent for derailing similar “pattern or practice of conduct” lawsuits brought by the Civil Rights Division, and burdening plaintiffs with unconstitutional restrictions and additional litigation expenses in the meantime.
Then again, perhaps it is telling that in the dozen or so such cases already filed by CRIT, this is the first time a case has been resolved on such counterintuitive grounds.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Jesus Osete has now stepped into the role vacated by Harmeet Dhillon, with the latest Section 12601-based lawsuit being one filed on November 9 against Glendale, California. The suit claims the “exorbitant government fees” for a concealed carry permit and the other requirements of the permitting regime, as enforced by the Glendale Police Department, amount to a “pattern and practice” that deprives residents of their fundamental right to keep and bear arms.
This is a developing story and your NRA-ILA will continue to keep you informed.











More Like This From Around The NRA







